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Abstract
The modern study of perception began when Fechner published his ‘Elements of Psychophysics’ in 1860. This book has guided
most perception research ever since. It has become increasingly clear that there are problems with Fechner’s approach, which
assumes that the percept is completely determined by the sensory input. Fechner’s approach cannot explain the processes that
allow our percepts to be veridical. Post-Fechnerian schools (Helmholtzian, Structural, Gestalt and Gibsonian) have tried to deal
with this problem, but have not been successful. An alternative to the Fechnerian approach is required. This paper describes an
alternative that has been developing over the last 20 years within the computer vision community. It treats perceptual
interpretation as a solution of an inverse problem that depends critically on the operation of a priori constraints. Contemporary
research, which adopted this approach, has concentrated on verifying the usefulness of Bayesian and standard regularization
methods. This paper takes the next step; it discusses theoretical and empirical aspects of studying human perception as an inverse
problem. It reviews the literature that illustrates the power of the inverse problem approach. This review leads to the suggestion
that progress in the study of perception will benefit if the inverse approach were to be adopted by experimentalists, as well as by
the computational modelers, who have been actively exploring its potential to date. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
The modern study of perception began with the
theoretical framework provided by Gustav Theodor
Fechner (1860/1966). The ‘percept’, according to Fech-
ner, is the result of a causal chain of events that starts
with a distal stimulus (e.g. an object), and proceeds
through a proximal stimulus (e.g. the object’s retinal
image), transduction, brain processes, and ends with the
percept of the distal stimulus. Fechner distinguished
two special kinds of relationships that involve the per-
cept, which he called inner and outer psychophysics.
Inner psychophysics, which deals with what is often
referred to as the ‘mind–body’ problem, refers to the
relationship between the percept and its underlying
brain processes. Outer psychophysics refers to the rela-
tionship between the percept and the stimulus (distal or
proximal).
Fechner concentrated his psychophysical studies on
outer psychophysics as the more tractable case. The
assumption that the percept is a result of a causal chain
of events led Fechner to a conjecture that the percept is
a mental measurement of the physical stimulus. It is
quite obvious how some properties of the proximal
stimulus, e.g. the intensity of light incident on the retina
or distance on the retina, can be measured by the
perceptual system. It is less obvious, however, how
properties of the distal stimulus, e.g. the shape of a
solid object, can be measured by the perceptual system.
It is less obvious because the perceptual system has
direct access only to the proximal stimulus, and the
relationship between distal and proximal stimuli is, in
general, quite complex. This means that an accurate
measurement of the proximal stimulus may actually
have little relevance to the distal stimulus. Consider the
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percept of a 3D object from a single retinal image. The
2D image projection determines an infinite number of
different 3D interpretations. Despite this geometrical
ambiguity, the observer usually perceives only one 3D
object and the percept is often veridical, i.e. the percept
accurately describes the physical object. Even if we
assume that the observer could ‘measure’ her retinal
image of the object, the result of this measurement
would not be sufficient to account for a ‘veridical’
percept of the object.
This difficulty can be avoided by using simple stimuli
that give rise to a one-to-one mapping between the
distal and proximal stimulus. For example, to decide
which of two line segments presented in the frontal
plane at the same viewing distance is longer, the visual
system can simply measure and compare the lengths of
the retinal projections of these line segments. Most
psychophysicists in the 19th century adopted this kind
of simplification. This early research led to several
important accomplishments, namely, theories of detec-
tion and discrimination, Weber’s and Fechner’s laws,
‘classical’ psychophysical methods, and mathematical
theory of measurement (Fechner, 1860/1966; Stevens,
1946; Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971; Narens,
1985; Suppes, Krantz, Luce, & Tversky, 1989; Luce,
Krantz, Suppes, & Tversky, 1990). Difficulty in general-
izing this measurement framework to more complex
stimuli that involved a many-to-one mapping from the
distal to the proximal stimulus eventually resulted in
the establishment of the Helmholtzian, Structural and
Gestalt schools. These schools provided evidence show-
ing that the percept is not merely caused by the proxi-
mal stimulus but involves: (i) unconscious inferences,
(ii) associating boundles of sensations, or (iii) a priori
assumptions or constraints biasing the percept towards
a simple interpretation. Such concepts cannot be readily
incorporated within the framework of Fechnerian psy-
chophysics. However, despite the fact that during the
last 100 years, much progress in our understanding of
perceptual phenomena has been made by those who
used inferences, associations, and a priori constraints in
theories of perception, Fechnerian psychophysics has
remained the most mature and theoretically the most
advanced framework for studying perception (e.g.
Luce, Bush, & Galanter, 1963; Falmagne, 1985).
The main goal of this paper is to describe and discuss
a framework for studying perception that avoids the
methodological limitations of Fechnerian psycho-
physics. This framework emphasizes the relationship be-
tween the distal and proximal stimulus and treats
perception as a solution of an inerse problem. The next
sections describe this approach and its implications for
the study of perception, and review empirical and theo-
retical results that demonstrate the benefit of this
framework.
2. Inverse problems and methods of solving them
Consider a mapping A from the distal stimulus X
(e.g. a 3D object) to the proximal stimulus Y (e.g. its
retinal image). If the object and its image are repre-
sented by homogeneous coordinates, the perspective
mapping A is a linear transformation. Thus, one can
write the following equation:
Y=AX. (1)
Finding the proximal stimulus for a given distal stimu-
lus is a direct (forward) problem and is expressed in the
rules of physics. Direct problems in natural sciences are
usually easy. Specifically, they are well posed and well
conditioned. A problem is well posed when: there is a
solution, the solution is unique, and the solution de-
pends continuously on the data. If one or more of these
criteria are not satisfied, the problem is ill posed. A
problem is well conditioned when the solution is com-
putationally stable (robust against noise).
In contrast to the problem represented by Eq. (1), an
observer is faced with an inverse problem. Namely,
perception is about inferring the properties of the distal
stimulus X gien the proximal stimulus Y :
X=A−1Y. (2)
This inverse problem is ill posed and/or ill conditioned.
This is related to the fact that finding a unique and
stable A−1, which is needed to determine X, is difficult.
Consider an example of the image of a cube. This
retinal image determines an infinite number of objects
whose faces do not have to be planar, edges do not
have to be straight-line segments, and the object does
not have to be symmetric. Clearly, the problem of
visual interpretation of the retinal image is ill posed, yet
whenever the retinal image could have been produced
by a cube, the observer perceives a cube (Attneave &
Frost, 1969; Perkins, 1972), except for degenerate cases
(Hochberg & McAlister, 1953). It is obvious that the
visual system is imposing constraints on the family of
possible perceptual interpretations. For example, when
the retinal image is produced by a polyhedron, the
observer’s percept corresponds to a polyhedron in
which the variance of all angles is minimal (Attneave &
Frost, 1969; Marill, 1991; Leclerc & Fischler, 1992;
Sinha & Adelson, 1992).
It is clear that imposing a priori constraints on the
family of possible solutions is likely to remove the ill
posedness of an inverse problem and thus leads to a
unique solution. It is not clear, however, whether this
approach will lead to veridical percepts. For this to
happen, the constraints should reflect the properties of
objects in the natural environment. Objects ‘out there’
are not completely arbitrary and random. Objects tend
to be continuous, piece-wise smooth, symmetric, and
are usually familiar to the observer. It seems reasonable
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to assume that an effective perceptual system should
obtain and use knowledge of the constraints that char-
acterize the distal stimuli to ‘make up’ for the informa-
tion that has been lost in the transformation from the
distal to proximal stimulus.
Let the constraints be denoted by PX. Let YX be the
partial information that the observer obtains about the
distal stimulus X from the proximal stimulus Y. The
percept of the distal stimulus X will be veridical if the
information obtained from the constraints PX and the
proximal stimulus YX is sufficient to compute (recon-
struct) X, or a good estimate X :
X =mX(YX,PX) (3)
In this equation, mX is a many-to-one mapping that
represents what and how is being computed. The sub-
script in mX refers to the fact that the mapping from
(YX,PX) to X depends, in the general case on X. This
means that a priori constraints can be incorporated not
only explicitly in the form of PX, but also implicitly in
the form of assumptions involved in computational
methods mX. For example, Ullman’s (1979) structure
from motion algorithm assumes that a 3D rotating
object is rigid. When the rigidity assumption (con-
straint) is satisfied, the algorithm produces a unique
solution (up to depth reversal). Otherwise, the solution
may not exist.
Determining YX given Y is not trivial. The perceptual
ability to solve this problem is related to the phe-
nomenon of figure–ground segregation, which in most
cases is itself an inverse problem. Since YX is a subset of
Y, the former can be thought of as resulting from a
mapping fX(Y)YX that selects the right features from
the proximal stimulus Y for the problem of reconstruct-
ing the distal stimulus X. Thus, Eq. (3) can be written
more fully as:
X =mX [ fX(Y),PX ]. (4)
In some cases, the reconstruction problem can be sim-
plified. The constraints P usually operate on the distal
stimulus X because properties of objects are more stable
than properties of images. But some properties of ob-
jects behave well under the transformation from the
distal to proximal: a straight line in 3D always projects
to a straight line under perspective transformation, a
symmetrical planar figure gives rise to a nearly symmet-
rical image, etc. In such cases, one can apply con-
straints P to the proximal stimulus Y. For example,
Gestalt rules of perceptual organization, which involve
constraints of good continuation, proximity, similarity,
etc., operate on the proximal stimulus and do not
depend strongly on the distal stimulus. Furthermore, in
some cases, the mappings m and f may not depend on
the distal stimulus X. For example, the problem of
figure–ground segregation can often be solved without
top-down knowledge about the distal stimulus, al-
though such knowledge can be beneficial (e.g. Pizlo,
Salach-Golyska, & Rosenfeld, 1997). Under such con-
ditions, Eq. (4) leads to a simpler form:
X =m [ f(Y),PY ] (5)
Examples of perceptual problems that can be ade-
quately represented by Eq. (5) include contour detec-
tion (e.g. Pizlo et al., 1997), and binocular
correspondence (e.g. Pollard, Mayhew, & Frisby, 1985).
If the proximal stimulus Y contains noise, there may
not exist a distal stimulus X that is consistent with the
proximal stimulus YX and at the same time satisfies the
constraints PX or PY exactly. In such cases, one has to
deal with the compromise between the two require-
ments. This compromise can be addressed in a natural
way by regularization and Bayesian methods. These
methods seem to be especially interesting because they
have strong theoretical foundations on the one hand,
and they lead to plausible models of biological vision,
on the other hand. However, other strategies for apply-
ing constraints in solutions of inverse problems have
been explored.
The regularization method of solving ill-posed in-
verse problems was formulated by Tikhonov in the
early 1960s (Tikhonov & Arsenin, 1977). In this
method, the solution is obtained by finding X , which
minimizes a functional:
E1=AX−YX2+PX2 (6)
where  is a regularization parameter. The first norm
evaluates how close the distal stimulus is to the proxi-
mal stimulus, and the second norm evaluates how well
the a priori constraints are satisfied. If the proximal
stimulus is reliable,  should be small, otherwise 
should be large. In Tikhonov’s theory, A is assumed to
be a linear operator, PX, a linear combination of the
first p derivatives of the distal stimulus X, and the
norms are quadratic. Poggio and colleagues (Poggio,
Torre & Koch, 1985) were the first to draw attention to
Tikhonov’s work in the vision community, even though
these methods were used earlier. Regularization meth-
ods have been applied to a wide range of visual tasks
such as contour detection (Shashua & Ullman, 1988),
motion reconstruction (Horn & Schunck, 1981;
Hildreth, 1984; Shulman & Aloimonos, 1988), shape
reconstruction (Ikeuchi & Horn, 1981; Grimson, 1982),
and color perception (Horn, 1974).
There is a stochastic version of the regularization
theory involving Bayes’ rule (Poggio et al., 1985; Bou-
man & Sauer, 1993; Kersten, 1999). Bayes’ rule allows
the computation of the posterior probability p(X YX)
as follows:
p(X YX)=
p(YX X)p(X)
p(YX)
(7)
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p(X) is the prior probability distribution for the distal
stimulus and represents a priori knowledge about ob-
jects in the environment. p(YX X) is the likelihood
function for X. This function represents the transforma-
tion from the distal to proximal stimulus and includes
information about noise in the proximal stimulus. Fi-
nally, p(YX) is the probability of obtaining the proxi-
mal stimulus. The inverse problem of determining the
distal stimulus based on the proximal stimulus can be
solved by finding X that maximizes the posterior proba-
bility, p(X YX). Such an X is called a Maximum A
Posteriori (MAP) estimator. The maximum of the prob-
ability distribution is not the only choice. One can use
other properties like the mean of the distribution. The
term p(YX) is a normalizing constant in Eq. (7) that
does not affect X and can be omitted in solving the
optimization problem.
To see more directly the relation between the deter-
ministic and stochastic methods of solving inverse prob-
lems, we take the logarithm of both sides of Eq. (7)
(ignoring the term p(YX)):
− log p(X YX)=− log p(YX X)− log p(X). (8)
Eqs. (6) and (8) are analogous (the regularizing parame-
ter  in Eq. (6) is implicitly represented in Eq. (8) by the
ratio of the variances of p(YX X) vs. p(X)). In fact,
under some assumptions about the probability distribu-
tions, maximizing the posterior probability p(X YX)
(Eq. (7)) is equivalent to minimizing the functional E1
(Eq. (6)). The Bayesian framework, however, is more
general than the standard regularization. For example,
in Bayesian formulation, the uniqueness of the solution
is represented by the uniqueness of the posterior proba-
bility distribution, not by the fact that this distribution
is unimodal, as in standard regularization (Tarantola,
1987).
It is obvious why some tasks, like perception of a 3D
object from a single image, are ill-posed, but it may be
less clear why binocular reconstruction of a 3D scene,
or perception of shape from motion should be ill posed
or ill conditioned. In fact, Gibson (1950, 1979) and
Rock (1983) claimed that in full-cue (‘ecologically
valid’) conditions, there is no ambiguity, and all the
important properties of the 3D scene can be simply
‘picked up’ or computed from the retinal images. Con-
sider an example in which an observer is viewing a 3D
object binocularly. Assume that the observer knows
exactly the position of one eye relative to the other (i.e.
interocular distance, vergence, etc.), that there is no
noise in the perceptual system and that the correspon-
dence of the points (or features) on the retinas is
known. Under such assumptions, the problem of recon-
structing any point in 3D space from the two images is
well posed and well conditioned. The observer can
simply find the intersection of the visual rays emanating
from the corresponding retinal image points and going
through the centers of projection (von Helmholtz, 1910/
2000). This intersection must exist and is unique.
Now consider the more realistic case, which acknowl-
edges the presence of perceptual and motor noise. In
this case, the two corresponding visual rays almost
never actually intersect (i.e. there is no solution).
Clearly, binocular reconstruction is an ill-posed prob-
lem. The ill posedness can be removed by any approxi-
mation method (e.g. the mid-point method, Hartley and
Sturm, 1997), but such approximations are quite un-
stable.1 Even a small amount of image noise (a stan-
dard deviation of 1% of image diameter) leads to very
large errors (a standard deviation of 80%) in the recon-
structed ratios of distances (Chan, Pizlo, & Chelberg,
1999). This instability demonstrates that the inverse
problem of binocular reconstruction is ill conditioned.
As a result, a binocular vision system must use con-
straints in order to stabilize the solution.
The fact that the percept involves a priori constraints
has been commonly recognized since the beginning of
the previous century when the Gestalt psychologists
described the operation of the rules of perceptual orga-
nization (Koffka, 1935). Surprisingly enough, however,
the current research on human perception is still domi-
nated by the Fechnerian framework: research questions
concentrate on perceptual and neurophysiological cod-
ing of sensory information. But constraints do not
merely contribute to perceptual coding. They represent a
critical tool in soling (eridically and reliably) an inerse
problem of perceptual interpretation.
The next section presents details of the framework of
inverse problems as applied to human perception. It
begins with theoretical aspects. This is followed by a
description of experimental methodology. Then, prior
research on human visual perception is reviewed and
compared to the main assumptions of the framework of
inverse problems.
3. Framework of inverse problems in human perception
3.1. Theoretical aspects
The discussion of the framework of inverse problems
presented in the previous section concentrated on com-
putational methods and did not incorporate aspects
that are characteristic of solving inverse problems by
human observers. We identify three such aspects of
human perception that have to be explicitly incorpo-
rated: (i) the locality of constraints, (ii) the phe-
nomenon of perceptual constancy and familiarity with
the environment, and (iii) the dynamic nature of the
proximal and distal stimuli.
1 See our demo illustrating this statement:
http://bigbird.psych.purdue.edu/binshape
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3.1.1. Locality of constraints
The first question is how the observer forms good
priors (constraints) for objects and events that can be
encountered. In principle, in order to have an estimate
of the probability of every event (distal stimulus), the
observer would have to experience every event more
than once. This is, of course, unrealistic (Maloney, in
press). To overcome this problem, the observer could
use the universal priors, which involve the concept of
simplicity and do not require any experience with the
stimuli (Li & Vitanyi, 1997). Although there is good
evidence that human observers use simplicity con-
straints in perception, these constraints are ‘local’ in
that they are formulated only in some subspaces of the
space of possible distal stimuli. This is reasonable from
a computational point of view. Information about the
distal stimulus that can be reliably obtained from the
proximal stimulus does not need to be replicated in a
priori constraints. Consider the visual perception of an
object in the 3D space. If there are no occlusions, the
geometrical properties such as shape specified in the 2D
subspace corresponding to the frontal plane of the
observer are reliably represented on the retina and do
not require any priors to interpret. The orthogonal
space corresponding to depth is not reliably represented
on the retina. Thus, only perceptual interpretations
involving the depth dimension require priors.
The use of priors that are defined only in a subspace
of the space of properties of distal stimuli allows the
perceptual system to solve the inverse problem for a
wide range of distal stimuli, including those that the
observer has never perceived before (as in the case of
the application of a smoothness constraint to an unfa-
miliar contour in a noisy image). In the case of objects
from our natural environment, such local priors tend to
apply to all properties (subspaces) that are not reliably
represented in the proximal stimulus, and as a result,
the percept is often veridical. The combination of the
information present in the proximal stimulus and infor-
mation provided by the constraints may sometimes be
insufficient for a unique and veridical percept. This
happens only when a distal stimulus does not have any
features in the subspace in which the constraints oper-
ate, or when the proximal information is ambiguous in
the subspace in which the constraints do not operate.
3.1.2. Perceptual constancy and familiarity with the
enironment
Perceptual constancy refers to the fact that the per-
cept of a distal stimulus is constant despite changes in
its proximal stimulus. The proximal stimulus may
change because of changes in the viewing conditions.
For example, when the orientation of an object relative
to an observer changes, the object’s retinal image
changes, but the percept of the object’s shape does not.
Let the observer’s percepts of X produced by two
different proximal stimuli Yi and Yj be X i and X j,
respectively. The constancy of the percept is represented
by:
X i−X j=0 (9)
Perceptual constancy is closely related to veridicality of
the percept, which is represented by:
X i−X=0 (10)
Perceptual constancy is a necessary condition for verid-
icality. If the percept is not constant, then it cannot be
veridical. Perceptual constancy is commonly accepted
as an adequate measure of the veridicality of the per-
cept. This is justified because the veridicality of a
percept (defined as in Eq. (10)) cannot always be ver-
ified. In the case of shape, the veridicality of the percept
can be verified because: (i) shape does not involve
measurement units (it is defined by ratios of distances),
and (ii) the percept and the distal stimulus are described
in spaces with the same number of dimensions (here
three). In other cases, however, establishing whether the
percept is identical to the distal stimulus can be prob-
lematical. Consider the case of surface color. Surface
reflectance is represented by a point in an infinitely
dimensional space, whereas the percept of the reflec-
tance is represented by a point in a 3D space. A 3D
property is almost never equal to an infinitely dimen-
sional one. In such cases, it is more convenient to define
perceptual veridicality in terms of the constancy of the
percept. After all, the constancy of the percept is equiv-
alent to the veridicality of the percept of differences.
Another reason for the centrality of the concept of
perceptual constancy is that human observers usually
operate in a familiar environment. Familiarity with a
distal stimulus X implies that the observer already has
in her memory a perceptual representation XM of this
stimulus. When presented with the stimulus X, the task
is simply to verify whether it is the same stimulus that
produced XM (perceptual constancy task). This can be
done by performing recognition, where the observer
matches the memory representation XM to the proximal
stimulus:
E2=AXM−YX (11)
If E2 is close to zero, the observer can conclude that the
distal stimulus X is identical with XM (Pizlo, 1994; Pizlo
& Loubier, 2000). If the memory representation were
produced by a stimulus similar, but not identical to the
distal stimulus, the memory representation XM may
serve as a source of additional constraint. This con-
straint can be incorporated by extending E1 (Eq. (6)) as
follows:
E3=AX −YX+PX+X −XM (12)
E3 is a combination of conventional regularization (Eq.
(6)) with perceptual constancy (Eq. (9)). In this case,
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the memory representation can be used as a starting
point in the task of finding the minimum of E3. One
can, in a similar way, incorporate recognition to the
Bayesian method of perceptual interpretation.
Objects from our environment often form ‘families’
consisting of objects that share some geometrical,
physical or functional properties. For example,
all human faces contain eyes, ears, a nose and a mouth.
The family of chairs contains objects that vary with
respect to physical and geometrical properties, but
share a functional property. A family of similar
objects can be represented by a prototype, or by
some characteristic features of the prototype. This kind
of memory representation is a useful source of con-
straint that can be incorporated in perception by
modifying the third term on the right-hand side
of Eq. (12):
E4=AX −YX+PX+BX −MX (13)
B is a projection of X onto the memory, and MX is the
memory representation of a prototype, which involves a
subspace of the space characterizing the distal stimulus.
This type of memory is quite efficient: storing ‘copies’
of all distal stimuli requires much more memory
space than storing only some characteristic aspects of
the stimuli. Furthermore, recognition based on proto-
types leads to a hierarchical organization of memory
that speeds up the memory search (Pizlo & Loubier,
2000).
3.1.3. Dynamic nature of the proximal and distal
stimuli
If an approach based on Eq. (4) or Eq. (5) is used to
solve the inverse problem of perceptual interpretation,
there is always a possibility that the solution will be
non-unique or unstable despite the use of constraints.
This may come about when the proximal stimulus is
too impoverished, as in the case of severe occlusion of
the distal stimulus, and does not allow the application
of all of the necessary constraints. Since the proximal
stimulus is a function of time (t), because of random
noise in the perceptual and motor systems and because
the distal stimulus is rarely static, the reconstruction
method based on Eq. (4) or Eq. (5) cannot assure that
X (t+1) will stay close to X (t). This means that percep-
tual constancy is likely to fail. Such failures can be
avoided when the regularization or Bayesian method is
used, by adding to E1 (Eq. (6)) a term stabilizing the
percept in time (adding this term resembles, although is
not equivalent to, Bayesian updating—Maloney, in
press):
E5=AX (t+1)−YX+PX+X (t+1)−X (t)
(14)
Regularization based on Eq. (14) has some resemblance
to Ullman’s (1984) maximizing rigidity approach
to the shape from motion problem. The temporal
stability term in Eq. (14) does not necessarily
represent rigidity— it refers to small changes in the
reconstructed distal stimulus, in general. An object
could be nonrigid, and this term could represent stabil-
ity of the sizes of individual parts or the color of its
surface.
Consider an example. It is known that binocular
judgments of distances in 3D are quite imprecise. When
the observer is asked to judge a distance along the line
of sight between two points, the threshold is quite large
(McKee, Levi, & Bowne, 1990). This illustrates the fact
that the proximal stimulus does not provide reliable
information and that this kind of impoverished distal
stimulus (two points) does not allow the visual system
to apply strong constraints. Nevertheless, in a single
trial, the two dots are perceptually stable and do not
appear to move relative to one other. Such temporal
stability of the perceived distance in conjunction with
the large threshold in judging distances suggests that
the percept involves some version of the cost function
E5 (Eq. (14)).
To summarize, the human perceptual system solves
the inverse problem of perceptual interpretation by
using a combination of constraints. The constraints are
applied to a subspace of the feature space of the distal
stimulus, and include not only simplicity (or likeli-
hood), but also familiarity (memory) and temporal
stability.
3.2. Experimental methodology
Early research on human perception emphasized bot-
tom-up processes, because they are conceptually com-
patible with the causal chain of events in Fechnerian
psychophysics. These processes include the coding of
the sensory information, as well as integrating this
information across sensory channels. There has been a
gradual shift towards including complex stimuli in psy-
chophysical research during the past half century.
Complex stimuli allowed the researcher better insight
into the mechanisms underlying the integration of a
number of cues. The writings of Brunswik, Gibson and
Marr represent this shift, which was greatly facilitated
by developments in computer technology. Complex
stimuli did not fit into the Fechnerian measurement
framework, and this fact caused theoretical psycho-
physics to lag behind deelopments in experimental psy-
chophysics.
In the framework of inverse problems, the classifica-
tion of experimental stimuli, and the corresponding
experimental methodology for studying psychophysics,
is different. There are two criteria for this classification:
(i) whether the perceptual system attempts to solve an
inverse problem, and (ii) whether effective a priori
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constraints can be applied to a given stimulus.2 When both
these criteria are satisfied, the percept is quite different
from the proximal stimulus, and the percept is stable
(reliable across trials and subjects) as well as veridical.
This experimental methodology is called here ‘inverse
psychophysics’. It often involves relatively complex and
structured stimuli, like those encountered in everyday life.
In such cases, the distal stimulus is different (and richer)
from the proximal stimulus, and the percept resembles
the distal rather than proximal stimulus (perceptual
constancy).
If effective constraints cannot be applied, but the
proximal stimulus and contextual cues provide informa-
tion about the differences between the distal and proximal
stimulus, then the perceptual system will attempt to solve
the inverse problem of perceptual interpretation. The
percept will be unstable, non-unique and non-veridical
because the inverse problem remains ill posed and ill
conditioned. This type of methodology is called here
‘underconstrained inverse psychophysics’. It always in-
volves unstructured, impoverished stimuli. Binocular
judgments of spatial relations among light points in total
darkness (Luneburg, 1947) are an example of undercon-
strained inverse psychophysics. Effective constraints do
not exist in this case because the stimulus is very simple,
but binocular disparity (a depth cue) provides information
about the fact that the distal stimulus is three-dimensional,
and thus, the visual system should provide such an
interpretation. Underconstrained inverse psychophysics
is often used to provide a baseline for perceptual perfor-
mance. It reveals the worst possible performance, i.e. poor
reliability and/or non-veridicality.
Finally, if effective constraints cannot be applied, and
the proximal stimulus and contextual cues do not provide
any information about the differences between the distal
and proximal stimulus, the perceptual system will not
attempt to solve the inverse problem of perceptual
interpretation. In this case, the percept will be a mere
coding of the proximal stimulus. The percept is likely to
be stable and unique, but it may be veridical only if the
distal and proximal stimuli are identical. This type of
methodology is called here ‘forward psychophysics’. It
usually involves very simple, impoverished stimuli.
Brightness detection and color discrimination of lights are
examples of forward psychophysics. Forward psycho-
physics is usually used to study the nature of coding
stimulus properties and to measure perceptual noise,
which is represented by the likelihood function in Eq. (7)
and by the regularizing parameter , in Eq. (6).
To learn about perceptual mechanisms that are in-
volved in solving an inverse problem, an experimental
study should establish first for which conditions and
stimuli the perceptual system actually solves the problem
and thus achieves veridical and reliable percept. It seems,
therefore, that the study should begin with the method-
ology of inverse psychophysics. Next, one should include
versions of the stimulus with ‘degraded’ structure. A
stimulus with degraded structure is one whose structure
has been modified in such a way that some constraints
can no longer be applied, or the constraints lead to
different interpretations. In the extreme case, a stimulus
with highly degraded structure may produce an experi-
mental condition described as underconstrained inverse
psychophysics. If the observer’s performance is strongly
affected by this manipulation, called here the ‘structure
degradation procedure’, one can conclude that the con-
straints under consideration are incorporated by the
perceptual system in solving the inverse problem of
perceptual interpretation.3 Ideally, an experimental study
using the structure degradation procedure should be
accompanied by formulating a computational model of
the perceptual mechanisms and testing the importance
and effectiveness of the hypothesized constrains in sim-
ulations.
One can discover constraints without using the struc-
ture degradation procedure. A commonly used alternative
concentrates on studying perceptual illusions. However,
illusions themselves have weaker implications for our
understanding of how the perceptual system solves an
inverse problem: An application of a priori constraints
to a distal stimulus that violates the underlying assump-
tions does imply a perceptual illusion. However, the
converse is not true. That is, occurrence of an illusion may
or may not indicate the operation of a priori constraints
in solving an inverse problem. Even if it does, it is still
not clear which perceptions benefit from the constraints.
For example, the perceptual significance of the vertical–
horizontal illusion is at present unclear. One can easily
incorporate this illusion in a computational model by
stretching the vertical dimension by several per cent. But
this manipulation would not represent the application of
the framework of inverse problems to perception. In the
framework of inverse problems, one would have to
demonstrate which percepts benefit from constraints that
produce a given illusion. Such a demonstration requires
the methodology of inverse psychophysics. Note that the
conditions producing illusion in conjunction with the
corresponding conditions of inverse psychophysics repre-
sent the structure degradation procedure.
2 It is quite commonly accepted that most (if not all) constraints
are built into perceptual processing mechanisms that automatically
operate on the proximal stimulus. But this does not necessarily imply
that all constraints are applied to every proximal stimulus. An
automatic perceptual mechanism could be ’smart’ in a sense that it
decides which constraints are applied to a given proximal stimulus
depending on the content of the stimulus. In other words, the
perceptual processing does not have to be purely bottom-up as
envisioned by Fechner, Helmholtz, Koffka, Gibson and even Marr. A
perceptual mechanism may even incorporate such top-down effects as
attention to locations and features (Palmer, 1994; Tsotsos et al., 1995;
Pizlo et al., 1997).
3 As pointed out above, constraints may be incorporated either
explicitly in the form of PX and PY in Eqs. (3)– (5), or implicitly, as
assumptions underlying the computational methods.
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The usefulness of a constraint in solving the inverse
problem of perceptual interpretation can be verified in
computational studies. However, such studies must be
accompanied by psychophysical experiments in order to
determine whether this constraint is actually being used
by perceptual mechanisms. To illustrate this point, we
analyze an example involving 3D unstructured (non-
sense) wire objects. Wire objects received widespread
attention in the vision community after Rock and DiV-
ita (1987) demonstrated a complete failure of shape
constancy with these stimuli. Consider the case of view-
ing a rigid wire object rotating around a vertical axis.
Several potentially useful constraints are present in this
case: rigidity of the object, smoothness of rotation,
fixed axis of rotation and physical realizability. But the
fact that these constraints are present does not mean
that the human visual system uses them to infer the 3D
shape of an object. The system may not use them either
because they are not effective or because they are
difficult to implement. Pizlo and Stevenson (1999)
showed that shape recognition from novel views of a
3D rotating wire object is indeed close to chance level.
At the same time, recognition performance in the case
of structured objects like polyhedra is very reliable. The
poor performance in the case of wire objects is not an
artifact related to the use of highly similar stimuli.
Phenomenologically, a wire object looks quite different
when viewed from different viewing directions (Rock,
Wheeler, & Tudor, 1989). Clearly, a subject’s shape
recognition performance indicates that the constraints
that are potentially useful in the case of wire objects are
not used by the human visual system. It follows that a
result of the experiment with wire objects says little
about how the visual system solves the inverse problem
of shape perception. In other words, wire objects seem
to ‘force’ the visual system to operate as if perception
were a forward problem, and thus, consistent with
Fechnerian psychophysics, rather than an inverse
problem.
4. Psychological relevance of the framework of inverse
problems
4.1. Deelopment of the main concepts
Gestalt psychologists were the first to recognize that
the percept does not reflect the nature of the proximal
stimulus. The percept follows the application of a priori
rules of organization (good continuation, proximity,
similarity, symmetry, etc.) to the proximal stimulus.
The rules of organization represent the operation of a
minimum principle (Law of Pra¨gnanz; see Koffka,
1935). According to the Gestalt psychologists, the per-
ceptual system chooses an interpretation that is consis-
tent with the proximal stimulus and is as simple as
possible (see Mach 1906/1959, who anticipated this
idea). This view fits the main idea underlying the frame-
work of inverse problems with simplicity corresponding
to the constraints PX (or PY) in Eqs. (3)– (6). Thus, the
Gestalt psychologists were close to changing the theo-
retical framework of psychophysics from Fechnerian to
one like that described in this paper. They did not,
however, succeed in changing it.
It seems likely that the main obstacle was that the
Gestalt psychologists did not think of an observer as an
information-processing system, which is trying to ac-
complish some goals, such as obtaining a veridical
perceptual representation of the environment. Goal-di-
rected behavior, obtaining, analyzing and communicat-
ing information, are elements that were first emphasized
by researchers who launched the cognitive revolution
(Craik, 1943; Rosenblueth, Wiener, & Bigelow, 1943;
Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Attneave, 1959;
Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Neisser, 1967). The
Gestaltists instead adopted the Fechnerian framework
and tried to explain percepts in terms of a causal chain
of events, with percepts being a reaction to stimulation.
This way of thinking neither generated plausible theo-
ries nor led to experimental methodology adequate for
studying the operation of the minimum principle. Ap-
proaches to perception that came after Gestalt psychol-
ogy, namely, Gibson’s (1950, 1979) ‘ecological (direct)
perception’ and Rock’s (1983) elaboration of
Helmholtzian unconscious inference, also adopted the
Fechnerian framework. Gibson’s ‘direct perception’
was the farthest removed from the idea of perception as
an inverse problem. Helmholtzian theory of the kind
proposed by Rock was a bit closer because it was based
on a likelihood principle that included elements resem-
bling the use of Bayes’ rule to maximize a posterior
probability (Rock, 1983, chapter 6).
After Shannon’s (1948) formulation of information
theory, there were several attempts to revive the Gestalt
approach by defining the simplicity principle in a more
precise way. In the case of perception of objects from a
single image, the simplicity principle was defined by the
minimum variance of angles, of lengths, as well as
symmetry (Hochberg & McAlister, 1953; Attneave &
Frost, 1969; Perkins, 1972, 1976). These studies showed
that the subject’s percept was systematically affected by
the degree of simplicity of the 3D interpretations (this
manipulation is equivalent to the structure degradation
procedure described in the previous section), and that
the judgments were quite reliable (consistent) across
subjects. All these studies demonstrated that the visual
system uses constraints, and these constraints lead to a
unique solution of the inverse problem of perceptual
interpretation. Furthermore, the results appeared con-
sistent with the proposed definitions of simplicity.
Hatfield and Epstein (1985) raised some criticism.
They pointed out that these studies confounded two
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theoretical statements: (i) the claim that the perceptual
system uses the simplicity (minimum) principle and (ii)
the definition of simplicity itself. By changing (ii), one
can either support or reject (i). It is obvious that
experimental studies cannot test the two statements
separately. Note, however, that whereas this criticism is
valid in the context of Fechnerian framework, it is not
valid in the context of the framework of inverse prob-
lems. In the framework of inverse problems, one does
not need to perform an experiment to verify whether
constraints such as simplicity are involved in obtaining
accurate percepts. The fact that constraints are involved
is a mathematical consequence of the nature of the
problem: constraints are needed because a solution of
an inverse problem tends to be non-unique and
unstable.
The simplicity of the interpretation is not the only
constraint that could be used in perception. Mach
(1906/1959) and von Helmholtz (1910/2000) suggested a
potential role for a likelihood principle that states that
the percept is the most likely interpretation of the
proximal stimulus. (Mach pointed out that simplicity
and the likelihood of the percept may represent two
aspects of the same perceptual mechanism.) Even
though the likelihood principle was introduced to psy-
chology at the end of the 19th century, it did not play
an important role in theories of perception for several
dozen years. This principle received attention only after
Gestalt psychologists pointed out the fundamental sig-
nificance of a priori constraints in perception
(Wertheimer, 1923/1958). Little was added to this until
Brunswik (1956) illustrated empirically what Mach had
conjectured half a century earlier, namely, that the
simplicity principle may often lead to the most likely
interpretation. The likelihood principle was not taken
seriously before Gestaltists came to scene probably
because most interesting applications of simplicity and
likelihood are those that involve context (Wertheimer,
1925/1938). The role of context (configuration, Gestalt)
was greatly underestimated by Helmholtzian and
Wundtian theorists, who instead emphasized the role of
local processing, expressed in the so-called ‘constancy
hypothesis’ (Koffka, 1935). More recently, there has
been a vigorous discussion (and antagonism) between
the proponents of each of these principles (Hatfield &
Epstein, 1985; Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986; Leeuwen-
berg & Boselie, 1989; Sutherland, 1989). Such antago-
nism is not surprising because these two principles have
usually been associated with the antagonistic philo-
sophical traditions of nativism and empiricism. Despite
many efforts (both theoretical and empirical), little
progress has been made to establish which of these two
principles is more important or more fundamental in
human perception.
Recent work in the area of information theory has
shed new light on this discussion, showing that the two
principles are, in fact, closely related. Specifically, if one
knows the probabilities in Eq. (7), one can find an
optimal description language that leads to the shortest
expected length of the description (Rissanen, 1983;
Leclerc, 1989; Chater, 1996; Mumford, 1996; Li &
Vitanyi, 1997). For such an optimal language, the
length (in bits) of a description is equal to − log2 p.
Thus, if the logarithms in Eq. (8) have a base of ‘2’, the
right-hand side becomes an expression that represents
the length of the code describing (i) the data (image)
produced by a given object (YX X) and (ii) the object
(X). Clearly, maximizing the posterior probability (Eq.
(7)) is mathematically equivalent to minimizing the
description length, which represents simplicity (or econ-
omy) of the description.
4.2. Experimental results
Studying how the perceptual system solves the in-
verse problem of perceptual interpretation pertains to
two different, although related, questions. The first asks
which constraints are used by the human perceptual
system, and how they are used, to guarantee a unique
percept. Studies addressing this question often involve a
restricted range of impoverished stimuli and viewing
conditions. The second (more difficult and more inter-
esting) question asks which constraints are used by the
human perceptual system, and how they are used, to
guarantee a veridical percept. Studies addressing this
question should involve a wide range of complex stim-
uli and viewing conditions. In principle, one could
study the veridicality of the percept for a single stimu-
lus and a single viewing condition, e.g. a cube viewed
monocularly from one particular direction. But a verid-
ical percept in such a case could merely represent a bias
towards the cube interpretation rather than the ability
to solve an inverse problem of 3D shape perception.
Prior research on the role of constraints concentrated
on the uniqueness and stability of the percept. The role
of constraints in achieving veridical percepts received
much less attention, but it is the emphasis on veridical
percepts that marks the adoption of the framework of
inverse problems.
The review presented below shows that prior psycho-
physical experiments testing the operation of con-
straints almost invariably used the structure
degradation procedure described earlier in this paper. It
is important to point out, however, that not all aspects
of the mechanisms involved in solving the inverse prob-
lem of perceptual interpretation can be answered by
using the structure degradation (or any other psycho-
physical) procedure. One of the critical questions is
whether a constraint guarantees a veridical and reliable
percept for a given set of distal stimuli. To answer this
question, one has to formulate mathematical or compu-
tational models of perceptual functions and test the
models with distal stimuli.
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4.2.1. Binocular ision
Quite possibly the first study on the operation of
constraints in perception was that of Panum in 1858
(see Howard & Rogers, 1995). He showed that a point
P on one retina can be fused with a point Q on the
other retina only when P falls inside some area S
centered around a point Q  corresponding to Q. The
area S representing the spatial limit for binocular fusion
is now called ‘Panum’s area’. Restricting the search for
corresponding points to Panum’s area reduces the num-
ber of possible matches and thus makes it easier to
obtain a unique and accurate solution to the inverse
problem of binocular correspondence. Tyler (1973) and
then Burt and Julesz (1980) generalized the concept of
a disparity limit to a disparity gradient limit. Ecological
justification for the operation of a disparity gradient
limit was demonstrated in computational studies: corre-
sponding points produced by an object’s surface often
give rise to a disparity gradient below 1.0; conversely,
disparity gradients exceeding this limit are usually pro-
duced by incorrect matches (Pollard et al., 1985). Note
that disparity limits represent the continuity constraint
in Marr and Poggio’s theory (Marr, 1982; Marr &
Poggio, 1976). Mitchison (1988) tested the psychologi-
cal plausibility of computational models that incorpo-
rate disparity constraints. He showed that the human
visual system solves the correspondence problem by
imposing planarity constraint. Specifically, it first estab-
lishes the correspondence for the boundaries and then
for regions, by minimizing departure of the 3D points
from planarity. Marr and Poggio also described other
constraints that might be involved in solving binocular
correspondence problem, namely, uniqueness and simi-
larity (compatibility). The role of a similarity constraint
was demonstrated by Prazdny (1985), who showed that
the human visual system can fuse points even when
their disparity gradient is greater than 1.0, provided the
non-corresponding points differ in contrast or size.
The correspondence problem could be simplified by
imposing the epipolar constraint. A given physical
point F and the centers of projections of the two eyes
determine a plane, which intersects the two retinas.
These intersections are called epipolar lines. It follows
that the two images of F must be on the corresponding
epipolar lines. As a result, the search for a correspond-
ing point on the second retina can be restricted to the
epipolar line. However, it does not seem that the visual
system uses the epipolar constraint probably because it
does not have accurate information about the torsion
of the eyes (Howard & Rogers, 1995).
Next, consider Nakayama and Shimojo’s (1992) ex-
periment. Their stimuli provided unambiguous dispar-
ity for the ends of a horizontal line and for the
intersection of this line with a vertical line. The regions
between these points did not provide information about
disparity. As a result, the orientation of the horizontal
line in depth was ambiguous: the line could be per-
ceived either as being in the frontal plane or as consist-
ing of two parts slanted (or curved) in depth. In other
words, the interpolation problem had more than one
solution. Despite this mathematical ambiguity, almost
all observers systematically reported a single percept
corresponding to a line in the frontal plane. Evidently,
the visual system is able to solve this problem, and it
does so by using constraining assumptions. The expla-
nation provided by Nakayama and Shimojo involves a
likelihood principle, similar to that described by Mach
(1906/1959)(pp. 213–214). Specifically, the given retinal
image could have been produced by a number of
viewing directions in the case of a line in the frontal
plane, and by only one viewing direction in the case of
a line slanted in depth. Thus, the former case is more
likely. Next, they demonstrated by a simple modifica-
tion of the proximal stimulus that the perceptual inter-
pretation changes from a line in the frontal plane to a
transparent patch in front of a cross. This new interpre-
tation is again consistent with the likelihood principle.
Grimson (1982) addressed the problem of recon-
structing a 3D surface from 3D points or features,
assuming that the points have already been computed
from binocular disparity or motion. Because the points
provide sparse information but the percept corresponds
to continues surfaces and contours, the stage of solving
correspondence and computing the 3D coordinates of
points must be followed by interpolation. Grimson’s
interpolation involved regularization algorithm that
maximized surface smoothness.
4.2.2. Motion perception
As was the case with binocular vision, the perception
of motion requires the visual system to solve an ill-
posed problem of establishing a correspondence be-
tween features in two successive images. Ullman (1979)
drew attention of the vision community to the impor-
tance of this problem. He conducted a series of psycho-
physical experiments to determine the operation of a
constraint called ‘affinity’ between two competing
choices. Affinity was defined by such geometrical prop-
erties of the image as distance ratio, size ratio and
orientation difference. By changing these properties, he
produced systematic and reliable changes in the direc-
tion of the perceived apparent motion. Thus, he showed
that similarity and proximity are important in achieving
a unique and stable perceptual interpretation. Ullman’s
work was subsequently extended by Burt and Sperling
(1981), who showed that spatial and temporal proxim-
ity are much stronger predictors of motion correspon-
dence than geometrical similarity among the elements
inducing apparent motion. All these results demon-
strated that motion correspondence involves local con-
straints operating on the retinal image. Later, He and
Nakayama (1994) showed that motion correspondence
also involves 3D global constraints.
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The studies of motion correspondence described so
far concentrated on determining constraints that are
involved in achieving a unique and reliable percept. The
veridicality of motion correspondence was studied by
Hildreth (1984). She analyzed the problem of determin-
ing the velocity field from the changing retinal image
produced by a motion in 3D space. The retinal image
was assumed to contain one or more contours, and the
computation was based on the motion of the elements
of the contours. This problem is ill posed, in part due
to an aperture problem, which refers to the fact that a
local mechanism analyzing motion of a line segment
can measure only one component of this motion, the
one that is normal to the line segment. The component
tangent to the line segment is not visible to any mecha-
nism. Hildreth showed that if image motion is produced
by a rigid 3D object whose edges are straight-line
segments, the smoothness constraint guarantees a verid-
ical interpretation. In other cases, the interpretation
may not be veridical; in such cases, however, the inter-
pretation tends to agree with illusory perceptions of
human observers (see Horn & Schunck, 1981 for an
analogous study in the case of a flow field without
contours).
Next, consider the problem of inferring the depth
and shape of a solid object from a moving image.
Wallach and O’Connell (1953) demonstrated that a
shadow of a rotating solid object often gives rise to the
percept of the object (kinetic depth effect). By manipu-
lating the geometry of the stimulus, they determined
that the 3D percept is produced only when the object’s
shadows ‘display contour lines that change their direc-
tion and their length’. Wallach and O’Connell did not
formulate a theory explaining the kinetic depth effect.
Such a theory (called structure from motion) was pro-
posed by Ullman (1979). The theory says that three
orthographic views of four (or more) 3D non-coplanar
points rotating in a rigid fashion allow for a veridical
reconstruction of the 3D structure of the points (up to
depth reflection). This theory accounts for a number of
results described by Wallach and O’Connell. In particu-
lar, the experimental conditions that did not produce a
3D percept in Wallach and O’Connell’s study do not
satisfy the necessary condition for a unique interpreta-
tion in Ullman’s theory. Note that the rigidity assump-
tion in Ullman’s theory plays a role of an implicit
constraint. The reconstruction is veridical only if the
object is rigid. Subsequently, Ullman (1984) generalized
his theory by using rigidity as an explicit constraint.
This new algorithm handles both rigid and non-rigid
objects and can account for some results where the
perceptual interpretation of a rigid rotating object is
not veridical (Loomis & Eby, 1988). More recent stud-
ies extended Ullman’s work to other cases, in which
constraints of the fixed axis or planar motion were
included (e.g. Hoffman & Bennett, 1986). To summa-
rize, prior studies demonstrated that human observers
are able to infer 3D relations from a moving image by
applying one or more constraints. Psychophysical ex-
periments concentrated, however, on a very restricted
set of 3D shapes and viewing conditions. Therefore,
these results did not shed much light on which con-
straints are used, and how they are used in achieving a
veridical 3D percept. Computational studies showed
that such constraints as rigidity may lead to a veridical
interpretation, but only when several revolutions are
used. Thus, the question arises as to whether veridical
shape perception from motion involves more visual
information (several revolutions) or more effective con-
straints. Existing results support the latter; this point
will be elaborated in Section 4.2.5.
4.2.3. Color and lightness perception
Systematic studies of lightness and color constancy
began with experiments by Katz in 1911 (see Gilchrist,
1994) and Gelb (1929/1938). When there is only one
surface in the field of view (and this surface is homoge-
neous with respect to albedo, i.e. there is no visible
texture), then the percept of the color of the surface
along the black–gray–white dimension (its ‘lightness’)
is neither veridical nor stable. Instead, the percept is
correlated with the intensity of the illuminating light.
This result is related to the fact that the intensity of the
reflected light confounds the albedo with the intensity
of the incident light. In order for the percept to be
stable, there must be at least two surfaces of different
albedos in the field of view. The percept of albedo is
determined by the ratio of the intensities of light
reflected by the two surfaces, at least for simple
configurations involving Lambertian surfaces in the
frontal plane (Hess & Pretori, 1894/1970; Wallach,
1948). For a given pair of surfaces, changes in the
intensity of the illuminating light do not change the
ratio of the intensities of the reflected light. Thus, the
constancy of the ratio is a necessary condition for the
constancy of the albedos, and it can be used in recogni-
tion of the albedo of a surface. The ratio rule is useful
only under the assumption (implicit constraint) that
spatial changes of the intensity of the illuminant are
smooth, and changes of the albedo are abrupt.
Gilchrist and Jacobsen (1983) tested the generality of
the ratio rule. The subject viewed a 3D scene containing
familiar or unfamiliar objects and was asked to judge
albedos of the 3D objects. The viewing was either direct
or through a veiling luminance. The veil component
increased all luminances by the same additive factor,
reducing ratios by a multiplicative factor of up to 15.
The judgments of the albedos were veridical in both veil
and no-veil viewing. It follows that the judgments
agreed with the ratio rule only in the no-veil condition,
and they violated the rule in the veil condition. When
the veil and no-veil viewing conditions were applied to
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a set of planar patches in the frontal plane (Mondrian
stimulus), the judgments in both conditions agreed with
the ratio rule and were veridical only in the no-veil
condition. These results indicate that color perception is
aided (constrained) by the information about the ge-
ometry of the 3D scene and that color constancy oper-
ates over the range of viewing conditions that are more
general than those to which the ratio rule applies. It is
known that 3D shape and space perception involves a
priori constraints. Thus, Gilchrist and Jacobsen’s results
do not represent a mere integration of visual cues
across visual channels (color and depth). Instead, they
represent an integration of constraints across visual
channels, which seems to be characteristic for solutions
of difficult inverse problems.
The ratio rule can be applied to all three types of
cones independently. This mechanism of color con-
stancy is consistent with von Kries’s (1902/1970) adap-
tation hypothesis, and it has been used in several
theories of color constancy (Horn, 1974; Land, 1986;
Brainard & Wandell, 1992; Foster & Nascimento,
1994). It is known that the spectrum of daylights varies
with only two degrees of freedom: intensity and the
correlated color temperature. It follows that it should
be possible to reformulate von Kries’s rule by removing
one degree of freedom. This was done by Lee (1990)
and then by Wei, Pizlo, Wu, and Allebach (1999).
Spectral properties of stimuli are coded in the visual
system by cones and then are transformed to opponent
channels, which code colors: red–green, yellow–blue,
bright–dark (Hurvich & Jameson, 1951). When a Mun-
sell surface is illuminated by one daylight first and then
by another daylight, the response of the red–green
channel is the same in these two cases (the red–green
channel is invariant). The chromatic change across the
two illuminants is represented in the yellow–blue chan-
nel, and the intensity change is represented in the
brightness channel. Clearly, the organization of the
human color system, i.e. the use of blue–yellow and
red–green channels for coding hues, reflects the highly
constrained nature of natural illuminants. This does not
imply that this constraint is used by the visual system,
but it indicates that the visual system ‘knows’ the
properties of this constraint. Preliminary experiments
showed that human color constancy is more reliable for
daylights than for non-daylights (Wei et al., 1999).
These results suggest that the constrained nature of
daylight is actually used in the perceptual mechanisms
responsible for color constancy.
4.2.4. Figure–ground segregation
Figure–ground segregation refers to the perceptual
ability to perceive which regions and contours in the
retinal image represent the object (figure) as opposed to
the background. Consider the detection of object con-
tours. Uttal (1975) was the first to test the role of
constraints in contour detection. His stimulus consisted
of randomly positioned dots and a target, which was a
set of dots representing a line. The line was either a
straight-line segment or a curve. The subject’s task was
to decide whether the target was present in the stimu-
lus. Clearly, the task of finding a set of dots represent-
ing a line in a stimulus consisting of N dots is ill posed
(each subset of dots represents a number of possible
contours). To solve the task, one has to impose con-
straints on the properties of contours. Uttal examined
three constraints, namely, proximity, smoothness and
regularity. All of these constraints are satisfied when
the target is represented by a set of equally spaced dots
that form a straight-line segment with small inter-dot
distances. Indeed, such a target was the easiest to
detect. When the inter-dot distances were large or irreg-
ular, the line was not straight, or it was not smooth,
detectability dropped. These results suggest that all
three constraints are necessary in contour detection (it
is possible that some of these constraints are implicit, or
that one constraint could result from the implementa-
tion of the others).
Uttal’s results were generalized by Pizlo et al. (1997),
who analyzed the role of global constraints. They
showed that the knowledge (memory) of the target’s
shape and orientation improved its detectability. How-
ever, the memory of the target shape alone, when the
orientation of the target was random, did not improve
detectability. It seems that the visual system can use
only such global information as can be translated into
local constraints (although the local constraints can be
applied on several levels of scale and resolution—Pizlo,
Rosenfeld, & Epelboim, 1995). Other studies of con-
straints in solving the inverse problem of contour detec-
tion and figure–ground segregation include those of
Bouman and Liu (1991), Vos and Helsper (1991), Field,
Hayes and Hess (1993), Lee (1995), Alter and Basri
(1998), Nakayama, Shimojo, and Silverman (1989),
Shashua and Ullman (1988), and Geisler, Perry, Super,
and Gallogly (2001). These studies demonstrated the
operation of local constraints such as smoothness of
contours and surfaces, and global constraints such as
homogeneity of regions and saliency.4
4.2.5. Shape perception
The approach of Hochberg and McAlister (1953),
Attneave and Frost (1969) and Perkins (1976) to the
role of constraints in shape perception was adopted and
subsequently elaborated by psychophysicists in the
1990s. Knill (1992) tested the role of a geodesic con-
straint. Geodesics can be defined as the shortest or
straightest lines on a surface (Hilbert & Cohn-Vossen,
4 As Ullman (1979) and Marr (1982) pointed out, at least some of
the global constraints can be implemented in a purely bottom-up
fashion by performing local operations.
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1990) and fully characterize the intrinsic properties of
surfaces. Knill’s study was motivated by Stevens’ (1981,
1986) theoretical and empirical studies suggesting that
human perception of surfaces involves the assumption
that the surface contours are planar geodesics, which
are also lines of curvature. Knill presented subjects with
a picture of a shaded solid object on which he superim-
posed a patch whose contours as projected on the
image were either straight-line segments (geodesics of a
planar surface) or geodesics of the surface of the object.
If surface geodesics are involved in the perception of
shape from shading, the observer should be able to
classify the patches into two categories: a planar, trans-
parent patch ‘floating’ in front of the object or a part of
the surface of the 3D object. Knill found that the
subjects could reliably perform this classification, sup-
porting the claim that the visual system uses a geodesic
constraint. Observers are able to interpret shapes of
surfaces from lines that are not geodesics. Therefore,
Knill also tested the usefulness of two soft measures of
the geodesic constraint that evaluated the variability of
geodesic curvature and showed that subjects classified
curves as surface contours more often when the vari-
ability of geodesic curvature was small.
Mamassian and Landy (1998) tested the perception
of the 3D shape represented by surface contours. The
subject’s task was to classify the surface as elliptic or
hyperbolic. Subjects’ classifications were systematically
affected by the stimulus geometry suggesting that the
percept involved some constraints. The authors formu-
lated a Bayesian model, which incorporated preference
for convex surfaces, for surface orientation correspond-
ing to viewing the object from above, and for surface
contours representing lines of curvature that are
geodesics.
To summarize, prior studies showed that perception
of color, depth, motion, shape and figure–ground seg-
regation require a priori constraints because the infor-
mation available in the proximal stimulus is inherently
ambiguous and thus determines an infinite number of
possible interpretations. A question arises, however,
about the generality of these results. Specifically, one
can argue that constraints were needed because the
stimuli in the studies described were impoverished. Per-
haps constraints would no longer be necessary, or their
role would be minimized, if the proximal stimulus
contained more information. By obtaining more cues
about the distal stimulus and its context, the observer
might be able to disambiguate the proximal stimulus
and obtain a veridical interpretation of the distal stimu-
lus in a bottom-up fashion, without using a priori
constraints. Thus, the question asked here is whether
constraints are used by the perceptual system only to
disambiguate the sensory information. Perhaps they are
essential for perceptual processing and are always in-
volved in solving inverse problems of perceptual inter-
pretation. According to the framework of inverse
problems, constraints are always involved. But does
this framework apply to all cases of perceptual interpre-
tation, including those that provide the observer with
strong contextual cues?
Recently, Pizlo and Stevenson (1999) and Pizlo,
Chan, and Stevenson (1999) addressed this question in
studies of shape perception involving motion and
binocular disparity cues. In one study, subjects were
shown two sequences of motion (20 images) of a rigid
3D structure and were asked to judge whether the
shapes of the structures were the same (Pizlo & Steven-
son, 1999).5 The two sequences of motion were 90 deg
apart. As a result, the sequences contained different
images, regardless of whether the shapes presented in
the two sequences were the same or different. In the
first condition, the stimuli were symmetric polyhedra
represented by planar contours. In this condition, per-
formance was very reliable. In the second condition, the
contours were no longer planar. This caused perfor-
mance to drop by a factor of two, which indicates that
perceptual mechanisms use the planarity constraint,
either explicitly by incorporating a measure of non-pla-
narity in the cost function, or implicitly by using al-
gorithms that assume that the contours are planar
(Hildreth, 1984). In the latter case, an object with
non-planar contours would be likely to lead to a per-
cept of a non-rigid object with planar contours. The
subjects reported seeing rigid objects with non-planar
contours, which suggests that the planarity constraint is
included explicitly in the cost function. In the third
condition, the subject was presented with only three
planar faces of the polyhedron from the first condition,
each of the two pairs of the faces sharing one vertex. In
this condition, the mutual constraining among the faces
of the object produced by topological relations among
them was minimized. Again, performance dropped, in
comparison to the first condition, by a factor of two.
This performance drop suggests that perceptual mecha-
nisms use constraints that rely on the 3D topology of
the object. In the last condition, where several con-
straints were removed (the stimulus was a polygonal
line connecting the vertices of the polyhedron in a
random order), performance dropped to chance level.
All of these results were replicated with binocular view-
ing of stationary shapes from a close viewing distance
(Pizlo et al., 1999).
Results of Pizlo and Stevenson’s (1999) and Pizlo et
al.’s (1999) studies show that shape perception inoles a
priori constraints een when depth cues are strong, and
that these constraints are used not only to disambiguate
the proximal stimulus. These constraints are used because
the perceptual interpretation is not only an ill-posed
problem but also an ill-conditioned problem.
5 See our Web page for examples of the stimuli:
http://bigbird.psych.purdue.edu/shapedemo.
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The fact that the perception of shapes relies critically
on a priori constraints, regardless of the amount of
information present in the proximal stimulus (single
view vs. two views vs. 20 views), suggests the following
hypothetical order of perceptual processing. Perceptual
processing begins with the reconstruction of a 3D shape
from one of the retinal images by applying constraints.
If more retinal images are provided from binocular
vision or from motion, the 3D percept is corrected (see
Chan, Stevenson, & Pizlo, submitted for publication for
details of the model). As pointed out earlier, a 3D
reconstruction based on binocular disparity is extremely
unstable in the presence of visual or motor noise, while
monocular shape reconstruction from a noisy image
with the use of constraints such as minimum variance
of angles and planarity is quite stable. Furthermore,
monocular shape reconstruction almost never produces
topological errors (Leclerc & Fischler, 1992). These
observations suggest that shape reconstruction from
binocular disparity and motion should begin with
monocular shape reconstruction.
The experiments of Pizlo and colleagues resolved an
apparent controversy in the perceptual literature. Spe-
cifically, Rock and DiVita (1987) demonstrated a com-
plete failure of shape constancy in the case of wire
objects viewed binocularly. Biederman and Gerhard-
stein (1993), however, demonstrated reliable shape con-
stancy from a single image of a structured object. These
two results appear contradictory within the framework
of Fechnerian psychophysics. How is it possible that
when more depth cues are provided, the percept is
much less veridical? The answer is straightforward
within the framework of inverse problems: The percept
of the shape of an object is not a mere result of the
stimulation of the retina; the percept depends critically on
the operation of a priori constraints. For unnatural ob-
jects, such as nonsense wire stimuli, adding depth cues
will neer compensate for the absence of effectie con-
straints. This example illustrates the kind of explana-
tory power that one might require before the new
framework can replace the old one.
5. Concluding remarks
Following the publication of Marr’s (1982) seminal
book, many studies began to treat the perceptual sys-
tem as a set of individual modules: binocular, motion,
texture, etc. An inverse problem was formulated for
each module. It is obvious that these modules are not
independent. They interact (e.g. shape with lightness).
It follows that one should study more than a single type
of perceptual information or constraint. The analysis of
the nature of inverse problems in perception, presented
in this paper, suggests that perception should be mod-
eled as a hierarchy of inerse problems (e.g. figure–
ground segregation, binocular and motion
correspondence, depth reconstruction, surface interpo-
lation). Once the need for such a hierarchy is acknowl-
edged, a number of questions arise. Is such a
hierachical approach realizable computationally? Fur-
thermore, would it be plausible psychologically? How
should the hierarchy be structured to produce best
results (i.e. stable interpretations, short reaction times,
etc.)? For example, does the visual system always solve
binocular and motion correspondence before proceed-
ing to reconstruct depth and objects? Is the order of
these stages fixed or dependent on the proximal stimu-
lus? This kind of question arises as soon as one adopts
the framework of inverse problems. Note that they
have only been touched on earlier in this paper and
have received little attention by those who have
adopted the inverse problem framework so far.
Prior research emphasized the use of knowledge
about the distal stimuli. It is reasonable to assume that
the human perceptual system is familiar not only with
the distal stimuli but also with some properties of the
cost functions that are used to solve the inverse prob-
lem of perceptual interpretation (Eqs. (6)– (14)). This
knowledge can be used to improve the efficiency of the
search for the global minimum of the function by
speeding up this search or avoiding local minima. The
continuation method in reconstructing shapes of poly-
hedra (Leclerc & Fischler, 1992; Chan et al., submitted
for publication) is one example of a realization of this
goal. It avoids local minima when the cost function is
sufficiently regular. A second example is the choice of a
good starting point to hasten the search for the global
minimum. Consider the well-known perceptual bias for
3D interpretations with right angles in reconstructing
the shapes of 3D objects (Perkins, 1976). In the past,
the bias towards rectangular interpretations was as-
sumed to reflect a constraint of the environment, but it
is possible that the bias for 3D interpretations with
right angles reflects a constraint of the process that
enhances efficiency of computations.
Now, consider the ideal-observer analysis as an ap-
proach to modeling the percept within the framework
of inverse problems (Kersten & Schrater, in press).
Conventionally, the ideal observer has been used as a
method of evaluating of how much information is lost
in the process of coding a proximal stimulus in the
perceptual system (Geisler, 1989). In the framework of
inverse problems, however, we are concerned with how
much and what kind of information is added to the
proximal stimulus in the process of inferring properties
of a distal stimulus. Thus, the conventional use of the
ideal-observer analysis is not applicable to inverse prob-
lems. Kersten and colleagues generalized the ideal-ob-
server analysis by using Bayesian models of perceptual
decisions (Knill & Kersten, 1991). The priors in the
Bayesian models represent the properties of the natural
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environment of the observer. Note, however, that these
properties are not known, which means that the ideal
observer may be less than ideal for a given set of stimuli
or a given task. To avoid this problem, the researcher
should formulate several ideal-observer models, with
different models representing different amounts of in-
formation about the physical environment (see Liu et
al.’s 1995 ideal vs. ‘true’ ideal vs. super-ideal). It follows
that the general ideal observer comes with a cost. It
requires a number of free parameters, which makes it
less attractive than the parameter-free, conventional
ideal observer (Liu, Knill, & Kersten, 1995; Liu &
Kersten, 1998).
In conclusion, now that we are approaching the 150th
anniversary of the publication of Fechner’s influential
book, which launched the psychophysical study of per-
ception, it is clear that a great deal remains to be done.
We are still far from understanding the nature of the
processes that allow our percepts to be veridical. This
paper set out to make it clear that an alternative
approach to Fechner’s is required; Fechner’s approach
cannot provide the answers we desire. The nature of
one such alternative approach, in which perception is
considered as an inverse problem, has been described.
Its current status, methods, and virtues have been
sketched out. One hopes that perception researchers
will explore the possibilities it opens up.
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